We present principles for the design of cryptographic protocols. The principles are neither necessary nor sufficient for correctness. They are however helpful, in that adherence to them would have avoided a considerable number of published errors.
Introduction
It has been evident for a number of years that cryptographic protocols, as used in distributed systems for authentication and related purposes, are prone to design errors of every kind. A considerable body of literature has come into being in which various formalisms are proposed for investigating and analyzing protocols to see whether they contain various kinds of blunders. (Liebl's bibliography [ll] contains references to protocols and formalisms.) Although sometimes useful, these formalisms do not of themselves suggest design rules; they are not directly beneficial in seeing how to avoid trouble. We present principles for the design of cryptographic protocols. The principles are not necessary for correctness, nor are they sufficient. They are however helpful, in that adherence to them would have contributed to the simplicity of protocols and avoided a considerable number of published confusions and mistakes.
We arrived at our principles by noticing some common features among protocols that are difficult to analyze. If these features are avoided, it becomes less necessary to resort to formal toolsand also easier to do so if there is good reason to. The principles themselves are informal guidelines, and useful independently of any logic.
We illustrate the principles with examples. We draw our examples from the published literature, in order to demonstrate the actual applicability of our guidelines. Some Generally, we choose examples from the authentication literature, but the principles are applicable elsewhere, for example to electronic-cash protocols (e.g., [15] ). We focus on traditional cryptography, and on protocols of the sort commonly implemented with the DES [18] and the RSA [26] algorithms. In particular, we do not consider the subtleties of interactive schemes for signatures (eg, [7] ). Moreover, we do not discuss the choice of cryptographic mechanisms with adequate protection properties, the correct implementation of cryptographic primitives, or their appropriate use; these subjects are discussed elsewhere (e.g., [30, 171) .
Throughout, we concentrate on the simple facts with the largest potential applicability and payoff. Admittedly, the literature is full of ingenious protocols and attacks. We do not attempt to organize the principles that underly this ingenuity, and perhaps it is not necessary. We hope that our simple principles and examples will be of help to the engineering of robust cryptographic protocols.
Basics
A protocol, for present purposes, is a set of rules or conventions defining an exchange of messages among a set of two or more partners. These partners are users, processes, or machines, which we will generically refer to as principals. In a cryptographic protocol the whole or part of some or all of the messages is encrypted. We interpret the term encryption fairly broadly, applying it for example to signature operations. Encryption and decryption are for present purposes defined as key-dependent transformations of a message which may only be inverted by using a definite key; the keys used for encryption and decryption are the same or different, depending on the cryptographic algorithm used.
We find two overarching principles for the design of secure cryptographic protocols. One principle is concerned with the content of a message and will
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the other with the circumstances in which it be acted upon:
Every message should say what it meansits interpretation should depend only on its content.
The conditions for a message to be acted upon should be clearly set out so that someone reviewing a design may see whether they are acceptable or not.
Next we explain these general principles. They lead to other, more specific recommendations, which we discuss in the subsequent sections. For example, an authentication server S might send a message whose meaning may be expressed thus: "After receiving bit-pattern P , S sends to A a session key K intended to be good for conversation with B". All elements of this meaning should be explicitly represented in the message, so that a recipient can recover the meaning without any context. In particular, if any of P , S , A, B , or K are left to be inferred from context, it may be possible for one message to be used deceitfully in place of another.
Explicit communication
Principle 1 is not completely original. In [4], we recommend the use of a logical notation in generating and describing protocols-essentially proposing a method to follow the principle. Establishing the correspondence between the logical protocol and its concrete implementation can be a simple matter of parsing, as for example in [31, Section 4.3.21. Although a precise comparison of informal ideas is difficult, we also find an affinity with Boyd and Mao's proposal that protocols should be robust in the sense that "authentication of any message in the protocol depends only on information contained in the message itself or already in the possession of the recipient" [3] . An operational variant on this theme appears in the work of Woo and Lam, who call a protocol full information if "its initiator and responder always include in their outgoing encrypted messages all the information they have gathered" [33].
Appropriate action
For a message to be acted upon, it not merely has to be understood but a whole variety of other conditions have to hold too. These often consist of what may informally be regarded as statements of trust, though this anthropomorphic notion should be used with care. Statements of trust cannot be wrong though they may be considered inappropriate. For example, if someone believes that choosing session keys should be done by a suitably trusted server rather than by one of the participants in a session, then he will not wish to use a protocol such as the Widemouthed-frog protocol [4] .
Principle 2
In general, we have:
Secrecy
The secrecy of certain pieces of information is essential to the functioning of cryptographic protocols. Obviously, a protocol should not publicize the cryptographic keys used for communicating sensitive data.
None of the our principles makes this point explicitly. Rather, all of our principles warn against mistakes that often imply the loss of secrecy, integrity, and authenticity. Some of the examples clarify how the principles relate to the need for secrecy.
There may be more to say about secrecy guidelines for cryptographic protocols, but these are outside the scope of the present paper.
Examples and other principles
Below we discuss many concrete examples where errors would have been avoided by use of our two basic principles. We also introduce other principles. Some of these are clearly corollaries of the basic ones, others are not. In particular, we recommend:
Hopefully, the two basic principles will encourage a certain lucidity in the design of cryptographic protocols, and thereby make it easier to follow our other principles.
Notation
We adopt notation common in the literature. That notation is not quite uniform and, in examples, we make compromises between uniformity of this paper and faithfulness to original notation.
In this paper, the symbols A and B often represent arbitrary principals, S represents a server, T a timestamp, N a nonce (a quantity generated for the purpose of being recent), K a key, and K-' its inverse. In symmetric cryptosystems such as DES, K and K-' are always equal. For asymmetric cryptosystems such as RSA, we assume for simplicity that the inversion operation is an involution (so ~-1 -l equals K ) ; we tend to use K-' for the secret part and K for the public part of a key pair ( K , K-'). We 
Naming
The most immediate instance of Principle 1 prescribes being explicit about names of principals: and C will believe that the message is from A. If the identity of a principal is essential to the meaning of a message, it is prudent to mention the principal's name explicitly in the message.
The names relevant for a message can sometimes be deduced from other data and from what encryption keys have been applied. However, when this information cannot be deduced, its omission is a blunder with serious consequences.
The principle is obvious and simple, yet it is commonly ignored. We give several examples of fairly different natures. This third message is encrypted for both secrecy and authenticity. When A sends this message to B , it is important that no other principal obtain K,b; the use of Kb provides this guarantee. f i rthermore, the intent is that, when B receives the message, B should know that A sent it (because of the signature with K;'). Finally, B should know that the message was intended for B (because of the use of K b ) .
Unfortunately nothing provides this final guarantee, with dramatic consequences. Any principal B with which A opens communication can pretend to a third party C that it actually is A, for the duration of validity of the timestamp.
For simplicity, we omit the exchanges which yield the public certificates CA, CB, and CC. When
The protocol is flawed. The connection between the messages is not sufficient. In particular, nothing connects B's query to S with S's reply. The protocol is therefore vulnerable to an attack, as follows. Suppose that B is willing to talk to A and to C roughly at the same time; A may be off-line. Then C can impersonate A:
where NF is the result of decrypting { N b } K c , using Kas. In Messages 1 and l', C tells B that both A and C want to establish a connection. In Messages 2 and 2', B replies with two challenges; C receives one normally, and captures the other one, which was destined to A's address. In Messages 3 and 3', C replies to both challenges. On A's behalf, it can send anything. On its own behalf, C responds to the challenge intended for A. Its intent is to allow two principals A and B to obtain a session key, with the mediation of local servers and gateways.
On the other hand, the fundamental flaw of the protocol is rather simple. One immediately sees that neither A nor B ever receives a message that contains the other's name. Obviously, this opens the door for confusions between different connections. It also allows some easy attacks to defeat the protocol. After we contacted them, the authors published a correction [13], where names appear in messages explicitly. 0
Encryption
The next group of principles and examples concern encryption. They are generally related to Principle 1, since they concern what encryption means and on what it does not mean.
The uses of encryption
As the examples below illustrate, encryption is used for a variety of purposes in the present con-
0 Encryption is sometimes used for the preservation of confidentiality. In such case it is assumed that only intended recipients know the key needed to recover a message. When a principal knows K-' and sees { X ) K , it may deduce that X was intended for a principal who knows K-'; and it may even deduce that X was intended for itself, given additional information.
0 Encryption is sometimes used to guarantee authenticity. In such case it is assumed that only the proper sender knew the key used to encrypt a message. The encryption clearly contributes to the overall meaning of the message. The extreme situation is that where a principal shows that a key is known by encrypting a null message or a timestamp. [6] and in order to reduce the total number of messages required. Like the Needham-Schroeder protocol on which it is based, the Kerberos protocol relies on symmetric-key cryptography. A slightly simplified version of the protocol goes:
Here, T, and T a are timestamps, and L is a lifetime. Initially the server S shares the keys K a , Examples 6.1 and 6.2, below, illustrate the interaction of encryption and nonces. In short, encryption is often used for binding when a nonce provides an association between a message and an implicit name. Following Principle 3, we make this missing name explicit. The use of both encryption and nonces is then much simpler and economical.
Signing encrypted data
Signature is used, as the name suggests, to indicate which principal last encrypted a message. It is frequently taken as also guaranteeing that the signing principal knew the message content. It is hard, but fortunately unnecessary to be precise about what knowing is. An informal notion is sufficient for stating the next principle: Principle 5
When a principal signs material that has already been encrypted, it should not be inferred that the principal knows the content of the message. On the other hand, it is proper to infer that the principal that signs a message and then encrypts it for privacy knows the content of the message.
Failure to follow this principle can lead to errors, as in the next example. Example 5.1 The CCITT X.509 standard contains a set of three protocols using between one and three messages [5] . The protocols are intended for signed, secure communication between two principals, assuming that each knows the public key of the other.
The CCITT proposal has problems. We discuss one problem described in Here, T, is a timestamps, N , is a nonce (not used), and X , and Y, are user data. The X.509 protocol actually uses hashing to reduce the amount of encryption. We do not show this because it does not affect our argument about X.509.
The protocol is intended to ensure the integrity of X , and Ya, assuring the recipient of their origin, and to guarantee the privacy of Y,. However, although Ya is transferred in a signed message, there is no evidence to suggest that the sender is actually aware of the data sent in the private part of the message. This corresponds to a scenario where some third party intercepts a message and removes the existing signature while adding his own, blindly copying the encrypted section within the signed message. This problem can be avoided by several means, the simplest of which is to sign the secret data before it is encrypted for privacy. 0 A particular case of the principle concerns hash functions:
Example 5.2 It is common to use hash functions in order to save on encryption with asymmetrickey systems (see for example [25, 103) . In particular, A can send a signed, confidential message to B as follows: An important part of the meaning of a message is made up of temporal information. Further, one common precondition for acting upon a message is that there is reason to believe that the message is fresh, and hence not a replay of an old one. This has to be inferred from something in the message, and evidently whatever this is should be bound together with the rest of the message so that the magic talisman cannot be attached to a message being replayed. It is important to understand properly how the freshness component works, and what is being assumed about it.
The next group of principles and examples concern time. They all address what must be assumed about proofs of timeliness, and what they actually prove.
Timestamps, sequence numbers, and other nonces
When guarding against replay of messages from an earlier run of the same protocol it is common to use nonces as part of a challenge-response exchange. A message is sent which leads to a reply which could only have been produced in knowledge of the first message. The objective is to guarantee that the second message is made after the first was sent, and sometimes to bind the two together. There is sometimes confusion about nonces-are they guaranteed new, random, unpredictable? Whence we propose:
Principle 6
Be clear what properties you are assuming about nonces. What may do for ensuring temporal succession may not do for ensuring association-and perhaps association is best established by other means. It is not essential for nonces to be unpredictable. In fact, the value of a counter makes a proper nonce. However, predictable nonces should be used with caution:
Principle 7
The use of a predictable quantity (such as the value of a counter) can serve in guaranteeing newness, through a challengeresponse exchange. But if a predictable quantity is to be effective, it should be protected so that an intruder cannot simulate a challenge and later replay a response.
Example 7.1 Protocols that rely on synchro-
nized clocks must be accompanied by protocols to access time servers. These protocols cannot themselves rely on synchronized clocks, but they can rely either on random nonces or on predictable nonces.
Using random nonces, we may have: . This protocol would not work if N, were predictable. An attacker C could make A set its clock back: early on, C makes a request for the current time using a future value of the nonce, saves S's response, and then forwards the response to A when A uses this value in a challenge.
When N, is predictable, it should be protected:
Message 1 A -+ S : A, { N a }~, .
The attack is no longer possible. Note that it is not important for N, to remain secret (and after all we have assumed it is predictable). The encryption in Message 1 serves to construct a quantity {N,}K,, that only A and S can predict from one that anyone can predict.
A similar exchange arises in the context of Kerberos. Neuman and Stubblebine suggest using Kerberos itself to obtain the time from a time server [22] . The quantity used as a nonce is roughly predictable: it is an incorrect timestamp; since it is encrypted, we expect no difficulties. 0 Freshness can also be proved by the use of timestamps. Timestamps are appealing because they seem easier to use than random numbers. However, their use is not always correct. There are number of aspects of prudent practice in the use of timestamps, and they are often misunderstood. One use of timestamps is as a kind of nonce. In this case the ultimate user of the timestamp, as part of a response, is the same as the originator of the challenge of which the timestamp was part. This style of use does not depend on clock synchronization at all, but does need care because the timestamp may be to a large extent predictable. Another style of use does depend on clock synchronization. The recipient of a message looks at a timestamp in it, and only accepts the message if the timestamp is within a reasonable interval of the recipient's local time. In this case we have:
Principle 8
If timestamps are used as freshness guarantees by reference to absolute time, then the difference between local clocks at various machines must be much less than the allowable age of a message deemed to be valid. Furthermore, the time maintenance mechanism everywhere becomes part of the trusted computing base.
Example 8.1
Timestamps have received abundant attention in the authentication literature. Gong, in particular, has described problems arising from the use of incorrect timestamps [8] . Therefore, we keep this example brief, summarizing Gong's example for the Kerberos system.
In Kerberos, as elsewhere, a principal with a slow clock is exposed to all sorts of difficulties, since the principal may mistake expired certificates for current ones. It is more interesting that a fast clock can also be an opportunity for attackers. If a principal A signs a request at time TO using a timestamp T, with To < T , an attacker C can replay this request near time T. The effect of the request at time T may benefit C , for example if C is using A's workstation at time T .
Bellovin and Merritt have discussed further problems in Kerberos, some of them in the use of timestamps. 0
What is fresh: use vs. generation
Roughly, a bit-pattern is fresh if any message that contains it must be recent. Clearly, it does not suffice that the bit-pattern participate in one recent message, if it may also participate in old ones. This observation is most important for keys:
Principle 9
A key may have been used recently, for example to encrypt a nonce, yet be quite old, and possibly compromised. Recent use does not make the key look any better than it would otherwise. Having obtained Kbs, B is able to verify using Tb that S has replied to a fresh message, so that the session key is indeed fresh.
However, B obtains no proof that Kbs is fresh. All that B can deduce is that Kbs has been used recently-but it may be an old, compromised key. 0
Recognizing messages and encodings
It seems important that principals recognize messages for what they are, and can associate them correctly with the current step of whatever protocol they are executing. There are two possible forms of confusion (which could in principle happen together): between the current message and a message of similar purpose form a previous run of the protocol, and between the current message and a message belonging elsewhere in the protocol, or to another protocol. Snekkenes [27] and Syverson [28] have constructed examples of protocols where these confusions can arise.
We believe that these confusions are less important when all our principles are correctly followed. If a message says what it means then we have no reason to be concerned with its context. The message is meaningful (or meaningless) on its own, whether we know that it belongs in a particular protocol instance or not.
Still, mapping a message to the appropriate protocol instance is convenient when it contributes to the compact encoding of the message. 
Principle 10
If an encoding is used to present the meaning of a message, then it should be possible to tell which encoding is being used. In the common case where the encoding is protocol dependent, it should be possible to deduce that the message belongs to this protocol, and in fact to a particular run of the protocol, and to know its number in the protocol.
Mapping a message to the appropriate protocol instance is often trivial if the message obeys our other principles. If the message contains sufficient timeliness guarantees and sufficient names, then the current instance cannot be confused with an old instance, or an instance for other principals. It could be confused with a concurrent instance for the same principals.
Next we give an example where this principle is relevant, but where other more important principles apply as well. Example 10.1 If signature or confidentiality are mediated by symmetric-key encryption then a particular form of confusion is associated with the direction in which a message is intended to pass.
In [34] and is taken further by Klein in her doctoral thesis. There are questions both of practice and philosophy to do with trust relations-for example whether they are transitive or not-which it would not be appropriate to pursue here. We may simply say that A trusts B in regard to some function if a loss of security to A could follow from B not behaving in the specified way; it is usually difficult or impossible for A to verify B's good behavior.
There is some measure of trust involved whenever one principal acts on the content of a message from another. It is essential that this trust be properly understood.
Principle 11
The protocol designer should know which trust relations his protocol depends on, and why the dependence is necessary. The reasons for particular trust relations being acceptable should be explicit though they will be founded on judgement and policy rather than on logic.
Example 11.1 Complete loss of security could follow from a Kerberos server issuing wrong timestamps. The server, and its source of time, must be trusted by all concerned. This, it may be pointed out, is a case in which clients can to some extent monitor the good behavior of the trusted server because the correct time is public and global. If a client reads GPS time it will have reason for suspicion if Kerberos' time is much at variance. 0 Example 11.2 The Wide-mouthed-frog protocol uses symmetric-key cryptography and an authentication server. It transfers a key from A to can be a complex matter to determine whether the statement of trust that the ACL represents is appropriate. Often, the question of whether it is appropriate makes little sense, particularly in the context of completely discretionary access control policies. Nonetheless, understanding ACL's and their consequences is crucial for security. 0 In practice it is not very common for complicated inferences about trust to be necessary. With the exception of the chains of trust of Example 11.3, which are likely to be simpler in practice than they might be in theory, it is usually not difficult to isolate the trust relations being relied on in a particular circumstance. It is valuable to do so explicitly, because this may lead to useful debate about the appropriateness of these trust relations.
Conclusion
We have found the principles and examples described in this paper useful in our own work. Perhaps it is because of this that they bear a certain subjective character. We do however believe that they respond to an immediate general need, in a discipline where some basic mistakes appear in print several times.
Many of our suggestions can be embodied in development methods and in formalisms. While these are helpful, we tried to emphasize an informal understanding of some issues essential for security. We hope that our guidelines will contribute to the improvement of the practice of designing cryptographic protocols.
